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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent in her Brief has discussed a number of 
"facts" which are no longer relevant for purposes of appeal. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 2-11). For example, Mrs. Nelson 
states repeatedly throughout her statement of facts and in 
the remaining portion of the brief that appellant American 
Bonding Company essentially settled a $200,000 claim of AAA 
Electric for only $30,000. (Respondent's Brief, p. 9-11). 
These statements concerning the alleged improper settlement 
of the claim are completely irrelevant to this appeal since 
neither Mrs. Nelson, Mr. Nelson, nor AAA Electric Service 
has entered a cross-appeal regarding the propriety of the 
lower court's judgment. The Respondent also completely 
ignores the findings of the lower court in which it was 
found: 
(1) That AAA and Keith Nelson failed to pursue these 
claims to their own accord and failed to request American 
Bonding Company to pursue such claims by posting adequate 
security. (Finding of Fact No. 6). 
(2) That the sureties acted in good faith in paying 
their claims. (Finding of Fact No. 7). 
(3) That while the sureties paid $87,667 in claims and 
legal expenses, of that amount $61,410 was disallowed by the 
lower court on the basis that there was insufficient 
documentation to support the claims, thereby resulting in 
a net judgment of only $26,257 in favor of the sureties. 
(Finding of Fact Nos. 9 and 10). 
(4) That the attorneys' fees charged by both Mr. 
Vanetta's lawfirm and by the firm of Snow, Christensen and 
Martineau are reasonable and recoverable under the 
circumstances. (Finding of Fact Nos. 11 and 12). 
Thus, the repeated arguments made throughout 
Respondent's Brief concerning the "15 cents on the dollar" 
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recovery by Appellant should be ignored. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CLAIM 
AGAINST DEFENDANT MAUREEN NELSON. 
A. The Terms of the Blanket Indemnity Agreement 
Controlled and No Notice Was Therefore Required 
Nor Was Participation in the Settlement 
Negotiations Required. 
Respondent in her brief argues that the terms of the 
contract implicitly reuired that notice of all claims be 
given to her before she assumed any liability. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 11-20). She relies upon the 
finding of the lower court that paragraph 13 of the 
agreement created an implicit requirement of notice and 
cites the lower court's reasoning that "otherwise the 
provisions of the indemnity agreement would have no 
meaning." (Respondent's Brief, p. 12). 
The decision is wrong for two reasons. First, there is 
no reason why the Principal and Indemnitor must receive 
notice from the Surety in order to post the required bond. 
They can learn through a number of ways including demands by 
creditors, service in lawsuits, etc. Certainly the 
Principal should know of claims being asserted against him. 
Does paragraph 13 require that he give notice to the 
Indemnitors? 
Second, both Respondent and the lower court have 
ignored basic principles of contract interpretation. 
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Paragraph 11 of the Indemnity Agreement specifically 
provided that no notice of any kind need be given to the 
indemnitors and, further, that the "indemnitors shall be and 
continue liable hereunder, notwithstanding any defense they 
might have been entitled to make." 
If paragraph 13 relating to settlements is read to 
explicity require notice before liability can be imposed 
against Respondent, then such provision would effectively 
annihilate the specific language contained in the 11th 
paragraph. It is fundamentail that contractual provisions 
which apparently conflict must be reconciled, if a 
reconciliation can be effected by any reasonable 
interpretation, before a court adopts a construction that 
would nullify any provision of the contract, Shepard v. 
Tophat Land & Cattle Co., 560 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1977). Here, 
to adopt the position taken by the lower court completely 
nullifies the language in the 11th paragraph. 
It is also fundamental that in contract cases if there 
is an inconsistency between clauses the specific provisions 
qualify the meaning of the general provisions. Brisco v. 
Merit Plan Insurance Co., 643 P.2d 1042 (Ariz. 1982). This 
doctrine has been adopted by the courts on the basis that 
specific provisions in contracts express more exactly what 
the parties intended than do general clauses or clauses 
where implications are made. Desbien v. Penokee Farmers 
Union Co-op Assn., 552 P.2d 917 (Kan. 1976). 
Paragraph 13 of the Indemnity Agreement allows the 
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principals and the indemnitors to require the surety to 
litigate a claim, provided the principal and indemnitors 
post sufficient funds to cover the cost of defense. Whether 
this clause implicitly states that notice will be given to 
the principal and indemnitors misses the point. Even if it 
did, the 11th paragraph clearly states that the principal 
and indemnitors cannot escape liability because of the 
failure to give such notice. 
In Cessna Finance Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048 
(Utah 1978) this Court interpreted a case involving a very 
similar provision in a guarantee agreement. The language in 
the guarantee agreement stated that the guarantor waived 
notice of default and all other notices "to which Guarantor 
might otherwise be entitled in connection with this 
guarantee." This Court stated: 
The waiver provision signed by the appellant 
above covered every kind of notice that the 
guarantor would ordinarily be entitled to receive. 
Appellant was not taken by surprise, he was 
dealing at arm's length and intelligently and 
knowingly waived notice. Despite that waiver 
provision, however, Respondent still tendered 
notice to make sure the guarantors were adequately 
and fairly informed of all aspects of the default, 
repossession, and sale of the collateral. In 
light of the waiver and respondent's subsequent 
fair dealing, it appears that Appellant has no 
basis for contending that he did not receive 
adequate notice in this matter. Id. at 1052. 
Thus, even if paragraph 13 of the Indemnity Agreement 
implied or suggested that notice be sent to the indemnitor 
and the principal concerning the claims, paragraph 11 
specifically provided that the failure to send such 
notice in no way negated any liability of the principal or 
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the indemnitors. The two clauses are therefore not 
inconsistent and the lower court was in error in concluding 
that paragraph 13 required notice to be sent and that 
failure to send such notice allowed Respondent to escape all 
liability. 
B. Assuming Arguendo that Notice Was 
Required Then the Notice Given to Maureen 
Nelson was Sufficient. 
Even if it is assumed that paragraph 13 required that 
notice be given to Maureen Nelson of the claim, and even if 
it is assumed that paragraph 11 is not applicable in 
excusing any failure to give adequate notice, the lower 
court was still incorrect in concluding that Respondent did 
not receive proper notice. Findings of Fact No. 2 merely 
concluded that the notice to Maureen Nelson was vague and 
insufficient and "did not afford her reasonable notice as to 
whether she should exercise the right to defend under 
paragraph 13." 
The court in its oral decision acknowledged that 
Respondent received or should be charged with receiving the 
November 19, 1975 letters which were sent to Respondent. 
The evidence was uncontested that Appellant sent to her not 
only a letter in her own name but also a copy of the letter 
sent to her husband. (Ex. D, Ex. C). The court in 
concluding that these notices were insufficient stated the 
following: 
It simply recites generaly that claims have 
been asserted against the bonding company in 
connection with these jobs. The letter itself 
does not cite who the claimants are, does not 
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indicate the amount of the claims, the nature of 
the claims, doesn't indicate the peril in which 
the indemnitors find themselves, and the court 
would conclude that one cannot be intelligently 
put on notice from that letter as to what it is 
that they are defending on, so would conclude that 
that does not satisfy the reasonable intent of the 
agreement. Accordingly, I would grant the motion 
to dismiss Mrs. Nelson. (Tr. 287). 
Since there is no express provision in the contract 
relating to notice, and since the lower court based its 
requirement purely upon an implied notice requirement of 
paragraph 13, it is difficult to understand the source of 
the various elements listed by the lower court in claiming a 
deficiency of notice. Certainly the letters sent to Mrs. 
Nelson indicated that claims were being asserted against the 
bond and that she had previously agreed to hold American 
Bonding Company harmless from any loss it would sustain as a 
result of paying claims. The letter to Mr. Nelson, a copy 
of which she was also sent, stated the name, address and 
phone number of the attorney handling the claims. Any of 
the information listed by the lower court in its decision 
could have been easily obtained had Mrs. Nelson merely 
contacted Mr. Vanetta. 
This Court has held in several instances that the 
substance of the notice must be examined over its form and 
that as long as a person is given an adequate opportunity to 
assert his rights under the terms of a contract, any 
technical deficiency in the notice will be overlooked. 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); 
Pioneer Dodge Center Inc. v. Glaubensklee, 649 P.2d 28 
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(Utah 1982); FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro Printers, 590 
P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). 
The lower court in its findings also noted that Mrs. 
Nelson was not kept informed about the negotiations which 
occurred between the parties after the initial notice was 
sent, that she was not made a part of the takeover 
agreement, nor was it submitted to her for approval. 
(Finding of Fact No. 4). This finding is completely 
unjustified in that there is nothing even under the implicit 
interpretation of paragraph 13 to require an indemnitor to 
be made an active party in the settlement proceedings. The 
only right which exists to an indemnitor is the ability to 
post a security for the defense of the claim, thereby 
requiring the surety to defend rather than compromise. 
Certainly once the indemnitor has been notified of the claim 
it is the burden of the indemnitor to monitor the 
negotiations and to decide if this option of defense should 
be utilized. An indemnitor under this agreement would have 
no right to demand that he or she be made a party to a 
takeover compromise. 
C• Even if it is Assumed Arguendo that 
Maureen Nelson Received Insufficient Notice 
She Made no Showing of Any Prejudice. 
Appellant contends, of course, that Mrs. Nelson 
received notice which was adequate to inform her of the 
claims being asserted. In addition, any deficiency in such 
notice was waived by Mrs. Nelson in the Indemnity Agreement. 
However, even assuming that neither of these arguments is 
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valid, it is still incumbent upon Mrs. Nelson to show 
prejudice caused by the failure to properly notify her. 
Respondent attacks the proposition that a showing of 
prejudice is necessary before the absence of proper notice 
can be used as a defense under the terms of the Indemnity 
Agreement. (Respondent's Brief, p. 20-24). Respondent 
cites the case of Aetna Bank v. Hollister as an 
authority relied upon by Appellant. (Respondent's Brief, p. 
21). This statement is incorrect since Appellant relied 
only upon the C.J.S. citation and not upon its cited 
authorities. In addition, the automobile insurance cases 
relied upon by Appellant are still controlling in spite of 
Respondent's efforts to distinguish them, since they all 
hold that mere lack of notice alone does not allow escape 
from a contractual liability agreement. (Appellant's brief 
in chief, pp. 15-16). 
There is no showing in the record that Respondent 
suffered any prejudice as a result of the supposed lack of 
notice required by the contract, no proffer was made by 
Respondent that she would have or could have done anything 
differently had she been advised of every fact or been 
invited to every negotiation which took place. Under the 
terms of the agreement Appellant was authorized to 
compromise and settle the claims unless the indemnitor 
specifically posted enough funds to cover the defense of the 
litigation. No evidence was introduced by Respondent that 
such funds were available or even that she would have 
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attempted to raise such funds had she been notified. 
In Pioneer Dodge Center, inc. v. Glaubensklee, 649 
P.2d 28 (Utah 1982), the debtor received notice that her 
repossessed truck would be auctioned off at 11:00 a.m. on a 
specified day; instead, the truck was sold at 10:00 a.m. 
Because the debtor did not show up at 11:00 a.m., this Court 
held that she was not prejudiced by the error. Likewise, 
there is no prejudice shown in this case by Respondent's 
alleged failure to receive notice. 
Respondent acknowledges that the "more recent and 
better reasoned cases" have held that where an indemnitor 
has not been given notice of the suit against his 
indemnitee, the failure of notice changes the burden of 
proof and imposes upon the indemnitee the necessity of again 
litigating and establishing actionable facts that the 
original obligee had against the principal. (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 17). Although Respondent denies that this 
occurred in the instant case, a review of the record shows 
differently. 
The remaining ten days of trial concerned a rehashing 
of all the various claims asserted by the parties against 
AAA Electric and by AAA's claims for additional 
compensation. Effectively, the appellant was required to 
justify all of the claims and offsets that were paid or 
credited during the dispute. As is evidenced by Findings of 
Fact Nos. 8 and 9, the lower court disallowed an offset of 
$61,410 which the government had claimed against AAA 
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Electric and which the appellant had paid to the government 
based upon those assertions. Thus, Appellant lost $61,410 
in this lawsuit because the lower court felt that the 
underlying facts of the original claim had not been proven. 
For this reason, therefore, because Respondent was 
represented by the same attorney representing AAA Electric 
she was given the opportunity to challenge all of the claims 
being asserted against her and AAA Electric in the original 
settlement agreement and even under Respondent's own 
authorities cannot now rely upon a notice deficiency to 
escape liability upon those claims which the lower court 
found to be valid. Essentially, Maureen Nelson was given 
her day in court as provided by Section 13 of the Agreement 
and was able to effectively eliminate a large portion of the 
claimed deficiency even though it was paid by Appellant in 
good faith. 
POINT II 
THE ACTIONS OF THE BONDING COMPANY IN 
SETTLING THE CLAIMS AGAINST AAA ELECTRIC 
WAS NOT A DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL 
UNDER THE UCC. 
Respondent contends that the Indemnity Agreement was a 
security interest under Colorado law which required the 
procedures outlined in Sections 4-9-504 of the Colorado 
Revised Statutes. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 24-26). Such 
argument is without merit. First, Section 9-504 of the UCC 
is inapplicable to this situation. Second, even if it were, 
adequate notice was given. 
Section 9-504 of the Colorado Revised Statutes is 
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identical to Section 70A-9-504 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
Both of these sections are inapplicable to the present case 
since (1) there was never a sale or disposal of any 
collateral, and (2) there were no third parties involved in 
any transaction. 
There was no sale or other disposal of collateral as is 
contemplated by Section 9-504. Appellant stepped into the 
shoes of AAA Electric and essentially paid its obligations 
and settled its debts. Respondent has cited no cases 
holding that an indemnitee which settles against the 
creditors of an indemnitor is disposing of collateral under 
the UCC. There simply are no cases to this effect. 
Second, there were no third parties involved. The 
debts were settled between the original parties to the 
various contracts. There was no sale or auction involving 
non-contracting parties who in any way were affected by 
these settlements. In the Willey v. Bank of Fountain 
Valley case cited by Respondent (p. 26) the actual sale of 
a promissory note to a third party occurred. Here, there 
was neither a sale nor a third party. The case is 
completely irrelevant to the present conflict. 
Even if this Indemnification Agreement is considered a 
security, there was still reasonable notice under the terms 
of the commercial code and no showing of prejudice was made 
by Respondent because of such lack of notice. Cessna 
Finance Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1978); 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). 
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For these reasons, therefore, Respondent's claim based 
upon the Uniform Commercial Code must fail. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED A "GOOD 
FAITH STANDARD" AND NOT A "COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE STANDARD." 
Finally, Respondent contends that Section 9-502 of the 
Colorado Revised Statutes applies in this case and that for 
Appellant to prevail it was encumbent upon it to show that 
it had proceeded in a commercially reasonable manner. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 27-28). This argument again 
ignores the clear language of the contract as well as the 
existing laws concerning indemnification agreement. 
The Indemnity Agreement in the third paragraph, 
entitled "Indemnity," provides that: 
The surety shall be entitled to charge for 
any and all disbursements made by it in good faith 
in and about the matters herein contemplated by 
this agreement under the belief that it is or was 
liable for the sum or sums so disbursed, or that 
it was necessary or expedient to make such 
disbursements, whether or not such liability, 
necessity or expediency existed; and that the 
vouchers or other evidence of any such payments 
made by the surety shall be prima facie evidence 
of the fact and amount of the liability to the 
surety. (Emphasis added). 
The lower court found that the sureties had acted in 
good faith in paying the claims and in making disbursements 
on such claims and that they should be reimbursed as to 
those claims which were supported by vouchers. (Finding No. 
7). 
The language contained in the indemnification agreement 
is standard in the industry and courts interpreting such 
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agreements have always held that the good faith standard is 
the correct one. Courts have universally held that an 
indemnitor may attack the payments of an indemnitee only 
upon the showing of fraud or a lack of good faith by the 
surety. United States Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Napier 
Electric & Construction Co., 571 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1978); 
Hess v. American States Insurance Co., 389 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 
App. 1979); Transamerican Ins. Co. v. Bloomfield, 401 
F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1968). 
This rule of good faith is grounded upon sound public 
policy. If sureties were bound to be right in the 
settlement of each claim, whether in defending a 
materialman's suit, contesting an owner's offset, or 
prosecuting the principal's extras, then tactics would 
dictate in most cases that each matter be litigated with the 
principal joined in the same action in order to obtain a 
consistent result and thus avoid "Monday Morning 
Quarterbacking" by the principal. 
As noted earlier, Respondent's attempt to place this 
litigation under the terms of the UCC must fail, since 
neither a sale of collateral nor third parties were involved 
in these transactions. In addition, the impracticality of 
applying the UCC Code to an indemnification agreement can be 
seen by examining Respondent's arguments. How does a party 
prove that a claim has been settled and compromised in a 
commercially reasonable manner? In other words, there is 
simply no commercial standard for the settling of lawsuits 
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and claims as there is for the selling and disposal of goods 
and other security interests. 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court was 
correct in applying the contractual language of good faith 
and in finding that the appellant did in fact exercise such 
good faith in the settlement of these claims* 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent has attempted to infuse a number of 
irrelevant factual claims into an otherwise simple factual 
dispute. Respondent has chosen those portions of the 
court's decision in her favor to argue vigorously and has 
ignored other portions of the decision which are against her 
interests. Respondent has not filed a cross-appeal in this 
case and therefore is necessarily bound by the entire 
decision rendered by the lower court, both favorable and 
unfavorable to her position now. Thus the repeated claims 
throughout Respondent's brief that the appellant wrongfully 
compromised the claims at a fraction of their true value 
should be struck from the arguments raised in this appeal. 
As to notice, it is clear that the Indemnification 
Agreement, while not precluding the giving of notice, did 
preclude a defense based upon the failure to receive notice 
or adequate notice. In any event, adequate notice was given 
to Respondent of the claim and her failure to reasonably 
pursue the potential claims cannot be charged against 
Appellant. In addition, she has been unable to show any 
prejudice which occurred because of the alleged inadquate 
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notice. 
Finally, the provisions of the UCC relied upon by 
Respondent simply are not applicable to the facts of this 
case involving an indemnification agreement. Regarding 
notice, however, even if such provisions were applicable, 
the requirements have been met. As to the standard of 
review, it is apparent that a "commercially reasonable" 
standard cannot be utilized in indemnification cases since 
there is no commercially reasonable standard in compromising 
and settling disputes. 
For these reasons, therefore, the judgment of the lower 
court should be reversed as a matter of law and judgment 
entered against Respondent Maureen Nelson. 
Dated this UJCL day of April, 1987. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
yki vuennis Norton y 
' Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing 
Reply Brief of Appellant were mailed postage prepaid to John 
L. McCoy, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 310 South Main, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 this IbtL day of April, 1987. 
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